The concurrence of health insurance expansion under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and increasing opioid-related mortality has led to debate whether insurance increases or decreases opioid deaths. I use the introduction of the ACA young adult (YA) provision as a quasi-experiment and utilize the resulting policy-induced variation across states over time in YA access to insurance to study the effect of coverage on opioid-related mortality. I rely on the share of state populations which stood to gain insurance before the ACA to perform a dose-response analysis, and find that the YA provision reduced opioidrelated mortality. The analysis suggests that 1 percentage point more coverage reduced opioid mortality among YA by 2.5/100,000 or 19.8%.
reduce need for painkillers through improved health, help treat addiction through mental health services and access to drug therapy, or improve treatment in case of overdose.
5 Implicit wealth gains due to expanded coverage may also counteract the economic malaise hypothesized to drive "deaths of despair" (Case & Deaton, 2015) . Empirically, arbitrating which effects dominate is complicated by potential reverse causality of opioid use and health insurance. Individuals may seek health insurance if they know they require opioid-related treatment. Conversely, individuals who suffer from opioid addiction may lack health insurance if, for example, they have trouble finding employment with employer-sponsored insurance. Thus, simple correlations will be biased in an ambiguous direction.
I estimate the causal effect of health insurance among young adults (YA) on opioid mortality through a quasiexperiment relying on the introduction of the ACA YA provision. I use public data on years 2000 to 2016 from the CDC's Multiple Cause of Death database (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC] , 2017). The main outcome variable in the analysis is the annual number of opioid deaths per 100,000 within the relevant age group by state between 2000 and 2016. Other state-level data, such as demographic characteristics and health insurance coverage, are based on 1-year estimates of the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS, United States Census Bureau, 2016) .
The ACA YA provision provides the identifying variation for the analysis. This provision mandated that insurers offer coverage to the children of beneficiaries up to age 26 and took effect at the end of 2010. Thus, the potential for gaining insurance through this provision depends only on age and time. The variation in health insurance induced by this change is therefore likely independent of individual characteristics, which might simultaneously affect the propensity to use and abuse opioids and the probability of carrying health insurance.
To motivate the analysis, I first present evidence comparing trends in opioid deaths among YA (ages 19-25) with the trends among those just too old to benefit from the YA provision (ages 26-30) . These trends show evidence of a relative decline in mortality among YA after 2011. Unfortunately, the existence of differential trends between the two groups before 2011 makes it difficult to assess how much of the change was due to the ACA, rather than age-specific time trends.
To circumvent this problem, I employ a dose-response (DR) approach among YA, which uses variation in the prereform share of individuals in each state who could have gained health insurance through the YA provision. 6 This approach has two advantages relative to comparisons across age groups. First, the DR does not display differential pre-trends. Second, it is helpful to restrict attention to a single age group in light of evidence that access to opioids among some segments of the population can lead to spillover effects on the entire region through increased drug availability (Powell, Pacula, & Taylor, 2016) . Thus, the DR approach provides credible evidence on the effect of health insurance on opioid mortality. The estimates indicate a reduction in 2011 mortality of 0.1/100,000 per percentage point (pp) of potentially insurable YA. This effect grows to 0.27/100,000 in 2013, before further ACA reforms took effect, and the decline accelerates further thereafter, reaching a reduction of 0.6 deaths per 100,000 per pp of potentially insurable YA by 2016. 7 In terms of health insurance coverage gained, two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimates imply that every pp of coverage reduced opioid deaths by 2.5/100,000, or 19.8%. To put this in the context of other policies targeting opioid mortality, Dowell, Zhang, Noonan, and Hockenberry (2016) find that limiting inappropriate opioid prescriptions reduced opioid deaths by 12%. Other policies specifically aimed at opioids have similar or smaller magnitude effects, suggesting that a promising approach to dealing with the opioid epidemic might include policies broadly affecting public health. 8 5 There is evidence of the latter mechanisms in, for example, Broaddus, Bailey, and Aron-Dine (2018) and limited evidence for an effect of insurance coverage on receipt of substance abuse disorder treatment in, for example, Maclean and Saloner (2018 and forthcoming) . 6 A similar approach to studying Medicaid's mortality effects was recently employed by Goodman-Bacon (2018) . 7 A possible concern with identifying the effect of insurance through changes after 2011 is that in 2010, the prescription opioid OxyContin was reformulated to be more abuse-deterrent. The assumption of the DR approach is that the share of uninsured YA in 2009 is uncorrelated with the extent of state-level exposure to this reformulation. Alpert, Powell, and Pacula (2018) provide rates of OxyContin misuse in the 10 states with most and least misuse in the 2004-2008 period. On the basis of these data, there is essentially no correlation between rates of OxyContin misuse and the potential insurance rate gain in 2009 (R 2 = 0.0067, p = 0.7). To provide further support for this assumption, I analyze (in the Supporting Information) the effect of the YA provision on heroin-related deaths specifically, as previous work has shown that the reformulation led to substitution towards heroin (Alpert et al., 2018) . My estimates indicate that in contrast to those findings, the YA provision is not associated with an increase in heroin-related deaths but rather substantially reduced such mortality. These findings suggest that the two channels are separate and that the variation due to the YA provision is orthogonal to the introduction of abuse-deterrent OxyContin.
The apparent effectiveness of health insurance in combating opioid deaths among YA may result from the fact that those who could potentially gain insurance were at particularly high risk of opioid abuse, and thus, the TSLS estimates reflect a particularly large local average treatment effect. For example, low income YA were particularly likely to be uninsured before the ACA, with 51% uninsured below the federal poverty line, compared with only 16% for those above 200% of the federal poverty line (Nicholson et al., 2009) . This paper contributes to the literatures on YA health insurance and the effect of health insurance on mortality. Previous studies have generally found that the ACA YA provision increased insurance coverage and that coverage for YA increased access to and utilization of healthcare. 9 The effect of the YA provision on mortality in general was examined in Scott et al. (2015) and McClellan (2017) , with conflicting findings. However, to date, the impact of the YA provision on opioid mortality has remained unstudied. With respect to the ACA more broadly, recent work on the Medicaid expansion has found that it cannot account for the opioid crisis, arguing that the crisis preceded the expansion (Goodman-Bacon & Sandoe, 2017) . My results show that the early elements of the ACA, notably the YA provision, can similarly not account for the crisis, and, in fact, likely ameliorated it. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the YA provision; Section 3 describes the data and methodology; Section 4 describes the results; and Section 5 concludes.
| YA COVERAGE IN THE ACA
The ACA was signed into law in March 2010, and one of its earliest impacts was expansion of insurance to YA, ages 19-25. This provision mandated that insurers allow family policyholders' children up to their 26th birthday to be included in coverage and went into effect on September 23, 2010. Before this, family plans generally only covered children up to age 18. Partially as a consequence, the uninsurance rate of YA was the highest of any age group in the years preceding the ACA, 29% in 2009 (Nicholson et al., 2009) .
Other major elements of the ACA went into effect in 2014. These included subsidized health insurance options, an individual mandate to carry insurance, and an expansion of Medicaid.
10 These provisions increased health insurance coverage above and beyond the YA provision itself (see, e.g., Frean, Gruber, & Sommers, 2017; Wettstein, 2018) . The interaction of the later ACA provisions with the YA provision likely further expanded coverage for YA, as parents gaining coverage due to other provisions could, through the YA provision, extend that coverage to their YA children. The analysis will separate estimates by year to clarify which outcomes result from the YA provision itself and which from the interaction of that provision with the rest of the ACA after 2014. Overall, the YA provision led to a sharp increase in health insurance coverage among YA. It is this change due to an exogenous policy shift that I leverage to study the effect of coverage on the opioid-related mortality of YA. The data and methods employed are described next.
| DATA AND METHODS
Public data on opioid deaths by age and state for 2000-2016 are taken from the CDC. They encompass deaths that have drugs as their underlying cause and then are further restricted such that their multiple causes of death include opium, heroin, methadone, other synthetic opioids, or other unspecified narcotics. For the main group being considered, I count deaths in the age range 19-25.
The data are tabulated by state (including the District of Columbia) and year. One limitation of the data is that cells containing fewer than 10 deaths are suppressed. Consequently, examining the data at the state level is a compromise between a finer geographic partition, such as counties, and a need to maintain sufficiently large populations, and therefore death counts, within cells. Similarly, estimates by single-year age groupings, which naturally encompass relatively few deaths, are also impractical with these public data. Even with these compromises, there are some state-year cells with fewer than 10 opioid-related deaths.
11 In the analysis below, I assume that all such cells incurred five opioid-related deaths. However, the results are insensitive either to assuming different death counts in suppressed cells or to excluding such cells completely.
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The analysis also calls for other variables such as health insurance. These variables are taken from the 1-year ACS estimates, accessed through IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2010) , and their means are calculated at the state-year level.
13 State population counts used to weight the cells are also based on the ACS. Furthermore, a number of other policies have been shown to impact opioid mortality in general. The analysis includes controls for legalization of medical marijuana (defined by states with legalized medical marijuana and active dispensaries, as in Powell et al., 2018) , for mandatoryaccess prescription drug monitoring programs (following the definitions in Buchmueller & Carey, 2018) , and for naloxone access laws (following the definitions in Rees et al., 2017) . In all these cases, the state-year is considered treated by these policies if they took effect in June of the year or earlier and not treated if the change occurred in July or later.
14 Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest for the pre-2009 period (inclusive) and for the post-2009 period. The small differences between the measures of deaths including or not including imputed deaths for cells with fewer than 10 fatalities demonstrate that the imputation is not very consequential. The mean potential insurance gain of 29% mirrors the 29% uninsurance rate among YA found by Nicholson et al. (2009) .
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The analysis proceeds in three stages: difference-in-differences, DR, and TSLS. The difference-in-differences serves to motivate the rest of the analysis. It demonstrates that age groups potentially gaining insurance through the YA provision experienced reductions in opioid mortality relative to age groups that did not benefit from the policy; however the two groups also display pre-treatment differential trends. Consequently, only descriptive trends are displayed below; however a full description of this method and its results is in the Supporting Information.
The DR approach focuses on the effect among ages 19-25. It relies on the share of the YA population in each state pre-reform which could have potentially benefitted from the YA provision to estimate a "DR" relationship of health insurance to opioid deaths among YA. To define P="potential insurance gain" I use the share of the ages 18 to 24 state population which was uninsured in 2009. This is the population which would have potentially benefitted from YA coverage starting in 2010.
P defines the "dose" of potential YA insurance each state is given. This variable is interacted with year indicators to estimate whether states that stood to gain more insurance did, in fact, do so once the YA provision went into effect; and whether they also experienced any change in opioid-related mortality relative to less treated states. The latter is done by estimating:
Y st is the number of opioid-related deaths per 100,000 among people age 19-25 in state s in year t (alternative specifications have the log of deaths per 100,000 as their dependent variable, to estimate a percent change in opioid mortality).
12 I use weights of state population counts. This makes small cells, which are most likely to have fewer than 10 deaths, uninfluential. Results under alternative treatments of suppressed cells are available from the author.
13 Using age-specific means for the relevant age group does not substantially affect the results.
14 There exists some debate over the proper way to code these policy variables (see Horwitz, Davis, McClelland, Fordon, & Meara, 2018) . The results in this paper are not sensitive to the alternative definitions I have tried.
15 Table SA1 displays the potential insurance gain for each state. There is a wide variation in the share of YA in 2009 who could potentially gain coverage through the YA provision across states. The share ranges from 8.7% (in Massachusetts), 11.9% (in District of Columbia), and 15.5% (in Hawaii) at the low end to 41.8%, 41.5%, and 38.6% (in Nevada, Texas, and Florida, respectively) at the high end. This variation is also not clearly clustered by geographic region, with each of the bottom four states representing one of the four census regions, for example. To the extent that geography is a factor in driving this variation, state fixed effects will control for it, along with other time-invariant state characteristics. Year main effects are controlled for nonparametrically. The vector X st includes further state-year level controls: the shares of women, Whites, Hispanics, married, in school, and employed, the average age and income, and whether the state has legalized medical marijuana, has a naloxone access law, and has a mandatory-access prescription drug monitoring program. σ s is a vector of state indicators; note that these state fixed effects control for the pre-reform value of P, alongside other invariant state characteristics. Observations are weighted by state population and standard errors are clustered at the state level. 16 The base year is 2010.
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In this equation, the pre-reform years interacted with P function as tests of the parallel pre-trends assumption. Insignificant δ τ coefficients on these interactions indicate that states with different levels of P did not experience differential trends in opioid mortality before the ACA. δ τ coefficients on the interactions of P with the years 2011 onwards plot the dynamic change in opioid-related mortality associated with greater potential gain in insurance after the policy change. Those on the years 2014 onward also include the differential effect of the rest of the ACA, above and beyond the YA provision, on YA in states with higher potential insurance gain.
Finally, I also employ a TSLS analysis to estimate the effect of health insurance on opioid mortality. The analysis examines the period after 2008, the first year that questions on health insurance status were included in the ACS. To estimate the effect of health insurance, the first stage has as its dependent variable the share of the state with health insurance, instrumented by the interactions P and year (the equation is identical to Equation 1 with insurance rate as the outcome). The first stage therefore verifies that the YA provision did, indeed, increase coverage more in states with greater potential to be affected by the policy change. The coefficients δ 2008 and δ 2009 test whether coverage changed differentially across low-and high-potential YA insurance gain states relative to 2010 levels. The coefficients δ 2011 − δ 2016 plot out the differential coverage gains after the policy change for low-versus high-potential insurance gain states. Overall, these year-P interactions estimate the policy-induced change in coverage.
These plausibly exogenous increases in coverage form the basis for estimating the effect of insurance on opioidrelated mortality. The second-stage equation is therefore
Again, the effect of insurance is estimated both in levels and in logs of deaths per 100,000 people. The latter specification is interpretable as a 1-pp increase in insurance leads to a 100 * δ percent change in opioid mortality.
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4 | RESULTS
| Motivating graphical evidence
I first compare insurance rates between YA and those slightly older than them, because the premise of the identification strategy is that insurance increased for YA after 2011 due to the YA provision. Figure 1 shows these trends, with the clear break apparent in 2011 for the YA, with no similar change for the 26-30 group. Before 2011, the groups' coverage rates move in parallel.
Next, I turn to opioid deaths in Figure 2 . It is evident that mortality rates for the two groups diverge strongly after 2011, consistent with the YA provision reducing mortality for YA. However, it is also apparent that substantial pretrends exist between the groups. Thus, it is unclear how much of the relative decline in mortality among YA after 2011 can be attributed to the YA provision and how much is due to differential time trends between the age groups. These differential pre-trends persist even with the inclusion of controls (see Supporting Information), motivating the DR design, which does not rely on a comparison across age groups. 16 Results are robust to weighting by a fixed state-level weight of year 2000 population. 17 Some specifications further include a control for the share of the state with public insurance. This variable is available in the ACS only from 2008 and on; consequently, in robustness checks including this control, and other specifications that necessarily include health insurance variables (such as the TSLS described below), years before 2008 are not included.
| Dose-response
I turn now to regression evidence. Table 2 presents the results of estimating Equation (1) under alternative specifications. Column 1 controls only for years and the interactions of P and year. Column 2 adds state fixed effects. Column 3 includes all the controls described above except for the share of the state with public insurance, which I treat as the main specification. Column 4 adds that final control. Finally, column 5 estimates the main specification in logs.
Reassuringly, generally no significant effects are estimated 2000-2009. This is consistent with no differential time trends between states with high-and low-potential insurance gains from the YA provision before its introduction.
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The lack of differential pre-trends is an intuitive test of the identifying assumption underlying this approach: that in the absence of the YA provision, states with different levels of potential insurance gain pre-2010 would not have had different mortality trends in the post-2010 period.
In contrast to the pre-2010 period, mortality rates begin to diverge in 2011 between states with low-and highpotential insurance gain. The estimates display remarkable stability across specifications, exhibiting robustness and supporting the assumption that the policy variation of the YA provision is exogenous to state characteristics. 20 In the 19 Almost no effects pre-2011 are significant at conventional levels; however, marginally significant estimates in 2009 in columns 1 and 2 disappear upon inclusion of all controls. The only exception is in logs, where a single pre-treatment coefficient (in 2000) is statistically significant. This may be a type I error, because 42 pre-treatment coefficients are estimated here. 20 In unreported results, the general patterns hold when also controlling for the interaction of state 10-year age-group shares with year. 19-25 (26-30) main specification in 2011, every pp of potential insurance gain is associated with a (marginally significant) 0.1/100,000 reduction in opioid mortality. However, the magnitude of the effect increases over time, consistent with the increasing coverage rates for YA due to the YA provision (as seen in Figure 1 ). By 2013, the year before the rest of the ACA went into effect, every pp of potential insurance gain led to a reduction in opioid mortality of 0.27/100,000. This estimate grows in magnitude to 0.6/100,000 by 2016, when it includes the effect of the other ACA policies affecting YA through their interaction with the YA provision.
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Column 5 of Table 3 presents estimates in logs, which can be interpreted as percent changes in opioid mortality per pp of potential insurance gain due to the YA provision. These estimates indicate that a small and statistically insignificant 1% reduction in opioid mortality per pp resulted from the YA provision in 2011. However, as coverage rates increased with take-up of the provision and, potentially, with cumulative health gains due to past coverage, this magnitude increases to 2.7% by 2013 (significant at the 5% level), before the rest of the ACA provisions went into effect in 2014. 22 The magnitude of the effect continues to grow over time, reaching 3.7% by the final year of the sample (significant at the 1% level). These patterns are consistent with health insurance reducing opioid mortality among YA, with suggestive evidence that the effect manifests with some lag, because it grows over time in the treatment period. This suggests that health insurance's salutary effects on physical and mental health, which might accumulate over time, play some role in the overall impact of health insurance on opioid mortality. It is nevertheless difficult to pinpoint how long a lag is required before the effects of health insurance are fully reflected in mortality rates, as both increasing insurance rates and accelerating declines in mortality persist through the end of the sample period.
Interpretation of the effect size in the DR approach is difficult, because potential insurance gain is not an intuitive measurement. Furthermore, the main economic and policy question of interest is not the effect of potential insurance 21 These estimates correspond to reductions of 2.9/100,000, 7.8/100,000, and 17.4/100,000 for the average state with 29% potential insurance gain in 2011, 2013, and 2016, respectively. 22 This corresponds to a 78% reduction in opioid-related mortality for the average state with 29% potential insurance gain. 
Deaths per 100,000
Log deaths per 100,000 Note. Columns display treatment effects yielded by Equation (1) per pp of potential insurance gain. The dependent variable is in levels for all columns, except column 5, where it is in logs. The controls in each column are indicated in the table, where "other controls" refer to shares of women, Whites, Hispanics, married, in school, and employed, average age and income, and whether the state-year had legalized medical marijuana, had enacted naloxone access laws, and had a mandatory-access prescription drug monitoring program. All columns control for year fixed effects. Observations are weighted by state population, and standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses.
***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1.
gains but of actual insurance gains. Next, I turn to estimating TSLS regressions to address this broader question and facilitate interpretation of the magnitude of the effect.
| Two-stage least squares
I estimate the effect of health insurance on opioid mortality among YA using TSLS, with two alternative sets of instruments. In the main specifications, the instrument is given by the two-period DR, the interaction of a post-2011 indicator with the pre-reform potential insurance gain. Alternative specifications use a set of six instruments, given by the interaction of an indicator for each year in the post-2011 period with potential insurance gain, as described in Equation (2). This latter approach has the advantage, in the first stage, of estimating the effect of the reform on insurance coverage dynamically, as in Equation (1). The first-stage estimates of the effects of the excluded instruments are in Table 3 . Column 1 displays the main specification of the two-period DR, column 2 further includes public insurance (which here does not lead to loss of early year observations, because those observations are lost already due to insurance rates being the dependent variable in the first stage), and columns 3 and 4 repeat this exercise with the dynamic DR instruments.
The first-stage estimates across the dynamic specifications show no evidence of differential pre-trends in health insurance coverage by the potential insurance gains of YA in 2009. However, in 2011, coverage increases more in states where there was more potential for gains. Looking at column 4, these relative gains grow over time, reaching an increase of 0.04 pp of coverage per pp of potential gains in 2013 and 0.2 pp of coverage per pp of potential gains in 2016.
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In all these specifications, the F statistic on the excluded instruments is larger than 10, the "rule of thumb" for rejecting that the instruments are weak. The instruments are particularly strong when public insurance is controlled for, due to more precise estimates: standard errors are smaller in these specifications leading to greater statistical significance, despite the point estimates also being moderately smaller. The TSLS scales the estimates from the reduced form in Table 2 by the increase in coverage estimated to have been caused by the YA provision in Table 3 to arrive at the mortality gains due to a pp of increase in health insurance coverage. The second-stage estimates are in Table 4 , with columns 1-4 corresponding to the parallel first-stage columns in Table 3 and column 5 showing the result of estimating the specification in column 1 in logs.
Across the specifications, health insurance has an economically and statistically significant negative effect on opioid mortality for YA, ranging between a 2/100,000 and 3.1/100,000 reduction in mortality per pp of coverage. Focusing on column 1, a pp increase in coverage leads to a decline in opioid mortality of 2.5/100,000. In percentage terms, column 5 implies that a pp increase in coverage results in a 19.8% decline in YA opioid mortality.
| CONCLUSION
The effect of health insurance on opioid mortality is subject to much debate. The observation that many of today's opioid addicts began using narcotics when they were prescribed to them by doctors has led to speculation that insurance could increase the risk of dying of opioid-related overdoses. Counter to this intuition, the possibility of accessing addiction and mental health treatment, alternative pain treatment, economic security, and general physical health induced by health insurance could reduce opioid mortality.
I find evidence to support the latter view. I estimate that insurance coverage significantly decreased the risk of opioid-related death among YA, with every pp of coverage reducing deaths by 2.5/100,000 or 19.8%.
These results have a few limitations. First, I focus on mortality; it is possible that health insurance increases the risk of opioid abuse, even while it reduces risk of death. Second, treatment effects are estimated only for 2011-2016. There is evidence that doctors' prescribing behavior with respect to opioids has changed in recent years, and it is possible that access to health care could have had deleterious effects on opioid mortality in the past, when doctors were more likely to prescribe narcotics liberally (Levy, Paulozzi, Mack, & Jones, 2015) . Finally, there is a need for caution in interpreting results based on the period since 2011. This has been the period of fastest growth in the opioid epidemic, and it is possible that evidence of comparability of treatment and control groups and their parallel pre-trends prior to this period is misleading with respect to their counterfactual trends after 2011. This paper underscores the potential of access to health care, mediated through health insurance, in combating the opioid epidemic. The results indicate that recent coverage expansions blunted the crisis. Furthermore, these results also indicate that although further expansions of coverage are not likely to completely prevent opioid deaths, they may go some way towards reducing them.
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